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A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF REID'S
WORK FOR HIRE FRAMEWORK AND
ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE
MARKETPLACE FOR
SCHOLARLY WORKS
SHERRI L. BURR*
Congress' paramount goal in adopting the 1976 Copyright Act
was to enhance "the predictability and certainty of copyright ownership."' In the marketplace for copyright works, it is important
that "the parties negotiate with an expectation that one of them
will own the copyright in the completed work."' 2 Through the negotiation process, the parties can settle on relevant contractual terms
such as the price for the work and the ownership of the bundle of
3
rights that comprise the copyright.
This article focuses on the marketplace for copyrighted works
produced by academics. Academics are hired by universities with
the understanding that in addition to teaching, they will conduct
research, analyze their research, and publish the results of their
analysis. The custom has been at many universities that academics
retain the copyright in their scholarly publications 4 and in their lectures when they are reduced to tangible form.5
The recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. James Earl Reid 6 sug* Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico Law School;
A.B., Mount Holyoke College, 1981; M.P.A., Princeton University, 1988; J.D.,
Yale Law School, 1985. I wish to thank Dean Theodore Parnall for providing
me with a summer research grant to work on this article. I also wish to thank
Leonard DuBoff, Fred Hart, Alfred Mathewson and David Nimmer for their
thoughtful comments on this article, and U.N.M. law students Darla Silva and
Karen Costello Rosa for their valuable research assistance.
Copyright 1990 Sherri L. Burr. All Rights Reserved.
1. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. James Earl Reid, 109 S. Ct.
2166, 2177 (1989) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 129 (1976)
reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5749).

2. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178 (quoting Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093,
1104-05 n.18 (9th Cir. 1989)).
3. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
4. See Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir.
1987).
5. Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929).
6. 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
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gests that if this custom were to be challenged in court, the result
would be difficult to determine.
This article examines Reid's construction of the "work made
for hire" definition in the 1976 Copyright Act and assesses its potential impact on academics. Part I provides an overview of the "work
made for hire" doctrine, from its judicial inception to its codification
in the 1976 Act and the subsequent controversial court interpretations of the doctrine under that Act. Part II provides a discussion of
the thirteen factors that comprise the Reid framework for determining when a hired party is an employee or an independent contractor, and applies these factors to the academic context. Part III
assumes that the academic is an employee and then provides an
analysis of the extent to which the university can claim the copyright to the creative products of the academic that are fixed in tangible form as arising out of the scope of employment.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE:
CONTROVERSIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN FEDERAL COURTS

The Constitutional provision that empowers Congress "[t]o
promote the Progress of... Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings ' 7 provided the
basis for the original Copyright Act of 17908 and four subsequent
major revisions, 9 the most recent being the Copyright Act of 1976.10
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright vests initially with
the author or authors of the work.'1 In most instances, the person
who actually creates the work is considered the author of the copyright. 12 The judiciary created a limited exception to this general
rule, 13 which Congress codified into law in the 1909 Copyright
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.

9. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16
Stat. 212; Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; Act of
Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-901 (1988)).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).

11. Id. § 201(a).
12. In controversies over where the initial ownership should vest, courts
have been consistent in granting it to the person who actually created the work.
See, e.g., Belford v. Scribner, 144 U.S. 488 (1892) (married woman who wrote the
book was entitled to copyright protection as against defendant's contention that
her husband was owner of copyrighted book by virtue of his marital rights);
DeWit v. Brooks, 7 F. Cas. 575 (C.C. N.Y.) (No. 3,851) (biographer who wrote
book owned copyright; not party who provided biographer with factual material
which enabled biographer to write book); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (letter-writer, and not the person to whom letter was
addressed, was entitled to copyright).
13. In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248-49 (1903),
the Court noted that the designs at issue "belonged to the plaintiffs, they having
been produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in their establish-
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Act 14 and expanded upon in the 1976 Copyright Act. 15 In the 1976
Act, the exception provides that "[i]n the case of work made for
hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
16
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Classifying a work as "made for hire" determines not only the initial ownership of its copyright, but also the copyright duration, 17
the owner's renewal rights with respect to works published before
ment to make those very things," and thus "the copyrights were taken out in
the proper names." This concept of works made for hire appears to have sprung
from a basic belief that the fruits of an employee's labor belong to the employer.
Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made for Hire" Under the 1976
Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485, 486 (1983). In 1967, a similar concept was
evident in § 286 of the California Labor Code, which provided "that everything
which an employee acquires by virtue of his employment, except the compensation which is due him from his employer, belongs to the employer." Williams v.
Weisser, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 866, 867 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1967).
14. Section 26 of the 1909 Act defined the word "author" to include "an
employer in the case of a work for hire." Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60349, § 26, 35 Stat. 1075-88. Section 23 of the 1909 Act provided that in the case of
any work copyrighted by an employer for whom such a work was made for hire,
the proprietor of such copyright would be entitled to the copyright. Id. § 23.
For a discussion of the work for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act, see
Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHi. L.
REV. 590, 594-98 (1989); DuBoff, An Academic's Copyright"Publishand Perish,
32 J. COpymiGHT SoC'Y 17, 18-23 (1984); Ossola, Work for Hire: A Judicial
Quagmireand a Legislative Solution, 17 J. ARTS MGmT. & L. 23, 28-31 (1987).
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101(1),(2) (work made for hire) & 201(b).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). The bundle of rights that comprised the copyright
are contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106 and include the right:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending; (4) in the case
of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly; and (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C § 106(l)-(5).
The implication from § 201(b) is that the parties could agree in writing for
the creator of the work to retain some of the rights contained in § 106, but in
the absence of such an agreement, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared obtains all of the creator's § 106 rights. Id. § 201(b).
17. "In the case of... a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a
term of seventy-five years from the year of its first publication, or a term of one
hundred years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first." 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(c). This term contrasts with the term for works created by individual authors, which expires fifty years after the author's death, and with the term for
works created by joint authors, which expires fifty years after the death of the
last surviving author. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a),(b).
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January 1, 1978, i 8 the owner's termination rights,19 and sometimes
20
whether the work is copyrightable at all.
As defined in Section 101, a work made for hire is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or comimissioned for use as a contribution
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas,
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed
by them
21
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
The plain language of this definition indicates that a "work made
for hire" arises from status and can only be prepared by either an
employee or a person specially commissioned or ordered to prepare
the work. If the work is prepared by an employee, then the work
must be within the scope of her employment to qualify as a "work
made for hire" under subsection (1). If the work is prepared on
special order 9r commission, then the work must fall within one of
the nine enumerated categories to qualify as a "work made for hire"
under subsection (2). While no written instrument is required in
the case of an employee work, a written instrument is required in
the case of a work prepared on special order or commission to make
it a "work made for hire." This requirement of a writing for specially ordered works under subsection (2) means that the creator of
that type of work must consciously give up the copyright to the
work that he or she would normally have as the creator of the
work. Conversely, with employee works produced within the scope
of employment under subsection (1), the 1976 Act presumes the employer to be the author and requires an express written instrument
signed by both parties for the employee to retain any of the rights
22
comprised in the copyright.
While it may appear clear on its face that by enacting subsection (2) Congress intended to "draw a statutory line between those
works written on special order or commission that should be consid18. Where the copyright was originally secured "by an employer for whom

such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to
a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of

forty-seven years." 17 U.S.C. § 304(a).

19. Works for hire are excluded from § 203 of the 1976 Act which permits

the termination of "exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of
copyright or of any right under a copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
20. No copyright may be claimed in a work written in a for hire relationship

if the employer is the United States Government or if the employer is not a
national of the U.S. See 17 U.S.C. § 105; 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 5.03 (1990).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 101(a),(b).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
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ered as 'works made for hire' and those that should not,"' 23 courts
have not always adhered to a statutory line. Since the 1976 Act was
adopted, much controversy has developed in the federal courts over
how section 101 "work made for hire" (1) & (2) should be interpreted, with some courts finding "commissioned works that clearly
do not meet the standards of subsection (2) to be 'employee' works
for hire under subsection (1 ).' 24 The most egregious of these cases
was the Second Circuit case of Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc.,25 which was followed by the Seventh Circuit in Evans Newton
Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software2 and the Fourth Circuit in Bruns27
wick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co.
The Aldon case arose out of the Spiegel Corporation's sale,
through its widely circulated catalogs, of brass unicorn statues that
the jury found infringed a valid copyright held by Aldon. 28 On appeal, Spiegel objected to the following jury instruction:
A work for hire is a work prepared by what the law calls an employee
working within the scope of his employment. What that means is, a
person acting under supervision of the hiring author, at the hiring author's instance and expense. It does not matter whether the for-hire
creator is an employee in the sense of having a regular job with the
hiring author. What matters is whether the hiring author caused the
work to 29
be made and exercised the right to direct and supervise the
creation.

Spiegel contended that the 1976 Act intended to treat regular employees and independent contractors separately, and that this jury
instruction defeated that purpose by permitting "the jury to find a
work for hire by an independent contractor if the work was 'at the
hiring author's instance and expense' and if 'the hiring author...
exercised the right to direct and supervise the creation,' without
reference to the categories of subdivision (2) or to the requirement
23. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 121 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737.
24. Ossola, supra note 14, at 35.
25. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
26. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). The court
agreed with the Aldon court and refused to characterize the issue as a distinction between defendant's status as an employee or independent contractor. Instead, the court characterized the issue as "[was] the contractor 'independent' or
(was] the contractor so controlled and supervised in the creation of the particular work by the employing party that an employer-employee relationship exist[ed]." Id. at 894.
27. 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987). In Brunswick Beacon, the court concluded
that "the copyright is owned by the newspaper publisher whose employees prepared it [instead of by the advertiser who ran the advertisement in the newspaper], unless there is a written agreement signed by it and the advertiser that the
work should be considered for hire." Id. at 414.
28. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 549.
29. Id. at 551.

124
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of a written instrument." 3
In affirming the judgment of the district court and in concluding that the jury instruction was not incorrect, the Second Circuit
chose to follow a line of cases developed under the 1909 Copyright
Act, concluding that Congress did not intend to dispense with these
cases when it adopted the 1976 Copyright Act. 3 1 The Aldon Court
formulated an "actual control test,"3 2 which stated that "if an employer supervised and directed the work, an employer-employee relationship could be found even though the employee was not a
regular or formal employee. 3 3s Aldon has been criticized by many
copyright scholars and commentators. 34
In contrast to the Second Circuit's conclusion in Aldon, the
Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and
Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises35 and the Ninth
Circuit in Dumas v. Gommerman 36 both concluded that Congress
30. Id.
31. Id. at 552.
32. This "actual control test" is distinguished from the "right to control
test" developed in other circuits. See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp, 601 F. Supp.
828, 828-29 (D. Colo. 1985) (citing 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 20, at
§ 5-12, 5-12.1 ("the crucial question in determining an employment relationship
is whether the alleged employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer performs his work")); Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F.
Supp. 137, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 20,
at § 5.03 (B)(9) ("The crucial factor to be considered... 'is whether the alleged
employer has the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the writer
performs his work'.")).
33. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
34. For criticism of Aldon, see A. LATMAN, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW
123-24 (6th ed. 1986); Dreufus, supra note 14, at 590; Ossola, supra note 14, at 3539; Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1987); Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire
under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretationand Injustice, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1293 (1987); Note, The Works Made for Hire Doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act after Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L. J. 265 (1986); Note, The Works Made for HireDoctrine under the Copyright
Act of 1976-A Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 649 (1986). At least one scholar, David Nimmer, had disagreed
with the criticism of The Aldon decision. Telephone interview with David Nimmer (Aug. 3, 1990).
35. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988). This case
concerned whether the Easter Seal Society, which hired the New Orleans public television station WYES to videotape a stage "Mardi Gras-style" parade and
a "Dixieland" musical jam session, owned the copyright to the resulting tape
because it was a work made for hire. Thus, the Society could prohibit Playboy
Enterprises from using portions of the tape in an "adult" film entitled Candy,
the Stripper. The court ruled that the Easter Seal Society was not the statutory
"author" of the tape because WYES was an independent contractor when it created the tape. Id. at 337.
36. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). The issue considered was whether Patrick
Nagel, the graphic artist and commercial illustrator, was an independent contractor or an employee when he created four works of art for ITT Cannon. The
court ruled that Nagel was an independent contractor. Id. at 1105.

1990]

Reid's Impact on Scholarly Works

intended to dispense with the reasoning developed by courts interpreting the 1909 Copyright Act, and to create a simple dichotomy
between employees and independent contractors.3 7 While both Circuit Courts noted that Congress did not define "employee" and
"scope of employment" within the 1976 Copyright Act, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Congress intended these terms to be interpreted according to the common law of agency,s 8 and the Ninth Circuit concluded that "only works produced by formal, salaried
employees are covered by 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)."39
II.

REID'S RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT: A THIRTEEN FACTOR
FRAMEWORK

In resolving this split among the circuits, the Supreme Court in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. James Earl Reid rejected
the "actual control test" articulated by the Second Circuit in Aldon
Accessories,4° and the "formal, salaried" employee test articulated
by the Ninth Circuit in Dumas.4 1 The Court chose, instead, to follow the conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal,
which held that the term "employee" within section 101(1) carries
its common law of agency meaning. 42 The Court stated "that Congress intended terms such as 'employee,' 'employer,' and 'scope of
employment' to be understood in light of agency law."'43 According
to Justice Marshall, the structure of section 101 indicates that "a
work for hire can arise through one of two mutually exclusive
37. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1096-97; Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 329.
38. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334-35.
39. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105. The Ninth Circuit, in Dumas, adopted its own
bright line, concluding that the statutory reference to employee in § 101(1) covers only formal, salaried employees. Id. In Reid, the Supreme Court declined to
follow this conclusion, instead choosing to rest its decision on common law principles of agency law, which the Dumas court had rejected as not fitting well
within the copyright context. Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2178 (citing Dumas, 865 F.2d at
1104 n.18).
40. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2174, 2177 ("Indeed, importing a test based on a hiring
party's right to control or actual control of a product would unravel the 'carefully worked out compromise aimed at balancing legitimate interests on both
sides.' ").
41. Id. at 2174 n.8.
42. Id. at 2172-74.
43. Id. at 2173. Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957)
reads:
Definition of a Servant
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of
the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
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means, one for employees and one for independent contractors.""4
In reaching this conclusion, Marshall articulated a framework in
Reid for determining whether an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor.
A.

Reid's Framework: Is a Hired Party an Employee or an
Independent Contractor?

In the fall of 1985, Community for Creative Non-Violence
(CCNV), a Washington, D.C. organization dedicated to eliminating
homelessness, entered into an oral agreement with James Earl Reid
to produce a statue to dramatize the plight of the homeless for display at a 1985 Christmas pageant in Washington, D.C.45 While Reid
worked on the statue in his Baltimore, Maryland studio, CCNV
members visited him on a number of occasions to check on his progress and to coordinate CCNV's construction of the sculpture's base
in accordance with the parties' agreement.4 After the completed
work was delivered to Washington, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the agreed upon price for the cost of the materials and
assistants-Reid donated his services. 47 The parties, who never discussed copyright, filed competing copyright registration certificates.
CCNV filed suit in the District Court seeking a determination that
the organization was entitled to copyright ownership because the
statue was a "work made for hire" as defined in the 1976 Copyright
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
44. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2174.
45. Id.at 2169.
46. Id.
47. Id.at 2170.
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Act. 4s The District Court ruled for CCNV. 49 The D.C. Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the sculpture was not a "work made for
hire" under the 1976 Copyright Act since it was not "prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment."'5° CCNV
then appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the proper construction of the "work made for hire" provision of the 1976 Copyright Act. 51
In affirming the decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals, Marshall enumerated thirteen factors to be used in determining
"whether a hired party is an employee under the general common
law of agency."152 The court considered these thirteen factors to be
an indicia of an employment relationship between the hiring party
and the hired party: (1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished;5" (2) the skill
required; 54 (3) the source of the instrumentalities and the tools;5
(4) the location of the work;6 (5) the duration of the relationship
between the parties; 57 (6) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party;58 (7) the extent of the
hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; 59 (8) the
method of payment;6° (9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying
48. Id.
49. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2170.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 2170-71.
52. Id. at 2178.

53. Id. This factor was also articulated in Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d
318, 320 (2d Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 133 (1st Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 220(1) (1957).

54. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178; see also, Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132
(1947); Hilton Int'l Co., 690 F.2d at 320; NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F.2d 379,
382 (3rd Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(d) (1957).

55. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178; see also NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390
U.S. 254, 258 (1968); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717-18 (1947); Dumas v.
Gomrnerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (1957).
56. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178; see also United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 258;

Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105; Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705
(4th Cir. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (1957).
57. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178; see also United Ins. Co. ofAm., 390 U.S. at 259;
Bartels, 332 U.S. at 132; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(f) (1957).
58. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105.
59. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; seef also United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 258;
Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d
567, 574 (8th Cir. 1984).
60. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105; Darden, 796

F.2d at 705; Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (1957).
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assistants;61 (10) whether the work is part of the regular business of
63
the hiring party;62 (11) whether the hiring party is in business;
(12) the provision of employee benefits; 64 and (13) the tax treatment of the hired party. 65
When the Court applied these thirteen factors to the facts in
Reid, it concluded that James Earl Reid was not an employee of the
Community for Creative Non-Violence when he created the statue
"Third World America," but an independent contractor" who thus
could claim rights of authorship in the work. The Court acknowledged that "CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their specifications," but
stated that "the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the
details of the product is not dispositive. ''6 7 Thus, while the first factor weighed in favor of finding that Reid was an employee of
CCNV, "all the other circumstances weigh[ed] heavily against finding an employment relationship."68 The court then concluded that
since Reid was not an employee when he created the statue "Third
World America," CCNV could not be considered the author of the
statue by virtue of 17 U.S.C. § 202(b). The following is a critical
assessment of each of these thirteen factors and their potential impact on academics:
1) The Hiring Party's Right to Control the Manner and Means by
Which the Product is Accomplished
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines a servant as "a
person employed to perform services in the affairs of another who
with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control."69 One of
the factors that determines whether a person acting for another is a
servant or an independent contractor is "the extent of control
which, by the agreement, the master exercises over the details of
the work. '70 The control or right to control needed to establish the
relationship of master and servant may be extensive or it may be
61. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also Bartels, 332 U.S. at 132; Silk, 331 U.S. at
719; Darden, 796 F.2d at 705; Short, 729 F.2d at 574.
62. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 259;
Silk, 331 U.S. at 718; Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105.
63. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 220(2)(j) (1957).
64. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. at 259;
Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105; Short, 729 F.2d at 574.
65. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; see also Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105.
66. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957).

70. Id. § 220(2)(a).
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attenuated. 71 The operative factor is that the employer has the
right to determine not only the results sought but also to control
the means by which those results are achieved. 72 The important
distinction is between service in which the actor's physical activities
and time are surrendered to the control of the master, and service
under an agreement to accomplish results or to use care and skill in
accomplishing results. 73 The more detailed the supervision and the
stricter the enforcement standards, the greater the likelihood that
an employer-employee relationship exists. 74 Those rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are not servants,75 but are independent contractors.
In Reid, the Court acknowledged that "CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their specifications," but stated that "the extent of
control the hiring party exercises over the details of the product is
not dispositive. ' ' 76 Reid had an obligation to accomplish a result,
i.e., to use his skill as a sculptor to produce a sculpture representing
the homeless. In fashioning the sculpture, "Third World America,"
Reid rendered service to CCNV, but retained control over the manner in which he did so.
In the academic context, permeating the relationship between
the faculty member and the university is the tradition of academic
freedom, which "guarantees a faculty member the right to teach
and conduct research freely... without fear of retribution or arbitrary dismissal. '77 Academic freedom rests on the assumption that
78
intellectual inquiry can only exist in an unfettered environment.
Historically, academic freedom has been viewed as a protection of
71. Id. § 220 comment d. In Dumas, the court explained "[w]hile the degree of control and input exercised by the buyer may be relevant to an inquiry
into joint authorship.... it will not ordinarily be relevant in determining the
employment status of the artist, just as this factor is not relevant in distinguishing between, for example, in-house and outside counsel." Dumas, 865 F.2d at
1105.
72. NLRB v. Maine Caterers, 654 F.2d 131, 132 (1st Cir. 1981); see also
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717 n.11 (1947) ("The undisputed facts fail to
establish such reasonable measure of direction and control over the method and
means of performing the services performed by these workers as is necessary to
establish a legal relationship of employer and employee between the appellee
and the workers in question.").
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment e (1957).
74. Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F.2d 318, 320-21 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that
while the hotel controlled each band's final product-working hours, locations,
type of music played-the band leaders exercised all the significant control over
the manner of their own and their musicians' performance).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment e (1957).
76. Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2179.
77. Olswang & Fantel, Tenure and PeriodicPerformanceReview: Compatible Legal and Administrative Principles,7 J.C. & U.L. 2 (1980-81).
78. Id.
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scholars' independence to teach not only what they have found, but
also what other scholars have found and thought. 79 Thus, when a
university contracts for a faculty member's services, it does so
knowing that it may not "prescribe the nature of the service to be
rendered."80
Accordingly, the university historically has not controlled the
manner and means by which professors produce scholarly output.
While most universities require academics to produce scholarly
works for promotion and tenure consideration, academics, even
more than Reid, retain control over the manner in which they produce their work. Professors choose the subject matter, when to
write, what to say, and where to publish. Academics must produce
scholarly output that enhances knowledge, but they retain control
over the manner in which they do so. In this sense, academics act
more like independent contractors than servants.
However, to the extent that the production of scholarly works
is a condition for promotion and tenure, the university may exercise
control over the number of such works that are to be produced. For
the nontenured faculty member, the university may require the
production of a certain number of works to obtain tenure. For the
tenured faculty member, the university may condition production
of a certain number of works on promotion, pay increases, and
other less concrete benefits such as travel allowances and research
support. Thus, while universities may not control the manner and
means by which academics produce scholarly works, they may control the quantity of output.
2) The Skill Required
The relation of master and servant is usually indicated by
"work which does not require the services of one highly educated or
skilled."8 1 Unskilled labor is usually performed by those customarily regarded as servants,8 2 whereas skilled labor is usually performed by independent contractors. However, there are, of course,
employment relationships where the persons rendering the services
are highly skilled, such as the relationship between staff physicians
and hospitals or between in-house counsel and corporations. In
these situations, the custom to control a particular occupation, together with the skill required in the occupation, can be given conclusive weight.8 3 In the Reid case, Reid was a sculptor, a skilled
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id. at 4 (quoting Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
SOCIAL SCIENCES 384 (1930)).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment h (1957).

82. Id. § 220 comment i.
83. Id.
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occupation.8 4 This fact would tend to make him an independent
85
contractor.
Similarly, to become a university faculty member requires a
considerable amount of education and skill. To be employed as a
law school faculty member, for example, the candidate must have
received a B.A. degree and a J.D. degree or its equivalent LL.B. (a
Ph.D. may sometimes be used as a substitute). The individual must
also be able to teach, research, produce scholarship, and demonstrate a commitment to serving the law school, the university, and
the general community. Thus, while the faculty member is highly
skilled, which would lead to viewing him or her as an independent
contractor, one must also look to the custom to control the particular occupation. Unlike staff physicians and in-house counsel, the
university does not control the details of the faculty member's
work. These facts lend weight to the view that the university
faculty member is an independent contractor for copyright
purposes.
3) The Source of the Instrumentalitiesand the Tools
The fact that a worker supplies his own instrumentalities and
tools is of evidential value that he is not a servant. 86 Where the
employer supplies the tools or instrumentalities, particularly those
of substantial value, that may indicate that the worker is expected
to follow the directions of the owner in their use.8 7 Similarly,
where the worker uses his hands and only provides tools such as
picks and shovels, an inference arises that the worker is an employee and not an independent contractor." In Reid, Justice Marshall noted that "Reid supplied his own tools," an indication that he
89
was an independent contractor.
This factor is less clear in the academician's case because the
academic works with both tangible and intangible tools, which are
supplied from different sources. In most instances, universities provide the tangible tools of office space, office furniture, computers,
typewriters, photocopiers, telephones, a library, books, paper, pads,
pens and pencils. The faculty member, however, provides the intangible tools, such as the source of the ideas and the expression of
the ideas. As one court has noted, "no one sells or mortgages all the
products of his brain to his employer by the mere fact of employ84. Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2179.
85. Id. at 2169.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment k (1957).

87. Id.
88. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1947) (finding that workers
who worked with their hands and provided only picks and shovels were not
independent contractors).
89. Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2179.
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ment." 9 Thus, this factor weighs in both the university's and the
faculty member's favor.
4) The Location of the Work
When a person works primarily away from the company's offices, chooses his or her own hours of work and work days, and has
independence, the person's status as an "employee" becomes less
obvious. 91 If the work is done upon the employer's premises with
the employer's machinery by persons who agree to obey the general
rules regulating the conduct of employees, the inference is strong
that the person is a servant of the owner.9 2 If, however, the employer's rules are made only for the general policing of the premises, mere conformity to such regulations does not indicate that the
person is a servant of the employer. 93
In the Reid case, Reid
clearly met this test of the independent contractor because he
"worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision
of his activities impossible." 94
In the academic context, the determination is less clear. While
the faculty member teaches and may conduct research at the university, part of the faculty member's preparation for teaching and
writing of scholarly articles may take place at home. For most
professors, the research of a problem takes place in the university
library, but the analysis and writing of the problem can take place
either at home or at the university. Moreover, the rules of the university tend to be made for general policing of the premises, and not
to regulate how faculty members conduct their work. Thus, the location of the work is not a determinant factor, particularly when
one considers that employees who create copyrighted works are less
likely to work regular hours than are other employees. 95 Indeed, at
least one court has noted that the distinction between work hours
and leisure time is illusory for academics. 96
5) The Duration of the Relationship Between the Parties
If the time of employment is short, the worker is less apt to let
90. Public Affairs Ass'n v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient

record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
91. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment 1 (1957).
93. Id.
94. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
95. Simon, supra note 13, at 489 (citing Brown v. Cosby, 433 F. Supp. 1331
(E.D. Pa. 1978)).
96. Williams v. Weisser, 273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542, 153 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 866, 867 (1967).
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the employer control the detail of the work.97 The implication is
that the longer the duration of the relationship between the parties,
the more likely the worker is controlled by the hiring party and,
thus, to be considered an employee. 98
In Reid, this factor supported a conclusion that Reid was not an employee of CCNV because he "was retained for less than two months, a relatively short
period of time."99
In the academic context, the relationship between the university and most of its faculty members is entered into with the intent
that it be long term. Tenured employees can remain employed with
the university until retirement age and are guaranteed that they
will only be terminated for a proven cause or grave infractions of
university policies. 1° ° The university appoints tenure track employees with the understanding that if the relationship progresses satisfactorily, then the university will grant them tenure. Contract
employees are appointed for shorter periods of time, but even these
periods of time are usually much longer than the two months involved in the Reid case. However, even though the relationship is
typically long in duration, the university has less control over the
details of the faculty member's work than it might over other staff
members. 1 1 Nevertheless, this factor might support a conclusion
that the faculty member is an employee of the university for copyright purposes.
6) Whether the Hiring Party has the Right to Assign Additional
Projects to the Hired Party
When the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party, the implication is that the hired party is
more likely to be considered an employee.' 0 2 In Reid, Marshall
found that during and after the two months relationship between
CCNV and Reid, "CCNV had no right to assign additional projects
to Reid,' 10 3 which indicated that Reid was an independent
contractor.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment j (1957).
98. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 132 (1947) (holding that the
band leader was the employer of the band members because the relations between the band leader and the other members of the band are permanent;
whereas those between the band and the person hiring the band are transient).
99. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
100. Olswang & Fantel, supra note 77, at 5, 12 n.52 (quoting F. DELON, LEGAL
CONTROLS ON TEACHER CONDUCT: TEACHER DISCIPLINE 11 (1977)).

101. See supra notes 69 through 80 and accompanying text for discussion on
the right to control test.
102. See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179; Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105
(9th Cir. 1989).
103. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2179.
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In the academic context, this factor weighs in favor of finding
that the faculty member is an independent contractor. At the beginning of the contractual relationship with the faculty member,
the university sets out criteria for the faculty member's employment and promotion. Usually, the university requires that the
faculty member teach a certain number of courses each year, produce a certain number of scholarly works within a specified period,
and participate in the governing of the university by serving on a
certain number of university and/or department committees.
While the university may assign specific duties within these broad
categories, the categories of obligation cannot be augmented. Of the
three broad categorical requirements, many universities place the
greatest emphasis on the production of scholarship because published scholars "attract prestige and students to institutions."'1 4 Indeed, a university may decrease some of its faculty members'
regular duties, by reducing a teaching load or by granting a sabbatical leave of a semester ora year, in order to increase the production
of scholarship.10 5 Nevertheless, while the university may emphasize the production of scholarship, it cannot arbitrarily assign additional projects to the faculty member. Thus, the faculty member
may meet this test of the independent contractor.
7) The Extent of the Hired Party'sDiscretion Over When and
How Long to Work
The hired party who retains control over the manner of doing a
project is more likely to be considered an independent contractor. x° 6 Hired parties who choose their own hours of work and work
days are not as obviously employees as are production workers in a
factory, whose hours are chosen for them by the company.1 0 7 In
Reid, "[a]part from the deadline for completing the sculpture, Reid
08
had absolute freedom to decide when and how long to work.'
Thus, Reid met this test of an independent contractor.
In the academic context, while a faculty member is required to
be on campus at certain times to teach, to host office hours, or to
attend committee meetings, a faculty member can prepare for class
for as many hours as it takes and at whatever location the faculty
member pleases. The faculty member can also exercise discretion
104. Simon, supra note 13, at 503.
105. Id. at 504.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment e (1957).
107. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968). See also Short
v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567,
574 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that in one of the appellee's cases must be added the
facts that he had considerable freedom to decide when and how long he would
work and that he could take vacation days without company approval).
108. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
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over the amount of time devoted to scholarly endeavors. Thus, this
factor weighs in favor of finding that the faculty member is an independent contractor.
8) The Method of Payment
When a hired party is paid by the hour or month, over a considerable period of time with regular hours, and works full time with
one employer, the relationship is more likely to be considered that
of employee/employer.' i 9 Employees usually work for wages or
salary under direct supervision, whereas independent contractors
undertake a job for a price, decide how the work will be done, frequently hire others to do the work, and depend for their income not
upon wages, but upon the difference between what they pay for
goods, materials, and labor and what they receive for the end result,
that is, upon profits.1 10 In Reid, "CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum
dependent on 'completion of a specific job, a method by which independent contractors are often compensated'." '
The compensation that a faculty member receives is most likely
to be considered a salary, but it might also be considered a contract
price for a specific job. Faculty members are paid a fee for a specified period of time, often for eight, nine, ten, or eleven months
work, which they can elect to have paid out over a longer period of
time. A more difficult issue may arise in the context of the summer
research grant or sabbatical leave, whereby the university compensates the faculty member for devoting a summer, semester or year
to producing a scholarly work. The summer grant or sabbatical
leave is usually provided after a letter or memorandum outlining
the research project is submitted to the dean or department head.
The dean or department head usually issues the grant, or permits
the sabbatical leave, with a note to the faculty member that the
time is to be spent working on the agreed upon project and not on
consulting or similar activities. Thus, this factor has equities on
both sides because the faculty member's remuneration could be
considered a salary or a contract price for a specified job.
9) The Hired Party'sRole in Hiring and Paying Assistants
This might be considered the "whoever-pays-the-piper-callsthe-tune" factor in the sense that independent contractors tend to
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment h (1957).
110. NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F.2d 131, 132 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. at 18 (1947)). This House Report on the
legislation establishing the Labor Management Relati-ons Act of 1947 specifically excluded "independent contractor" from the definition of "employee."
111. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
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hire and pay their assistants, whereas employees do not.1 1 2 Under
traditional common law principles, a hired party who has discretion
to hire and fire clerical employees without securing approval, even
though the hired party does not have discretion to hire counterparts, is likely to be considered an independent contractor and not
an employee. 1 3 In Reid, Reid had total discretion in hiring and
paying assistants, 114 a factor which weighed in favor of finding that
he was an independent contractor.
A more difficult case arises in the academic setting because
while the faculty member may select and supervise his or her research assistants, it is the university that usually sets the wage scale
and pays the assistants. In some instances, however, the faculty
member may pay the research assistants out of their own pocket or
from funds from an outside grant or contract. Furthermore, the
faculty member may have less discretion in hiring clerical employees than in hiring colleagues. In most institutions, the faculty members either decide or make recommendations on faculty
appointments and promotions," i5 but the hiring of clerical employees is done out of the dean's or department head's office. Thus, this
particular factor has merits for both the argument that a faculty
member is an employee and the argument that the faculty member
is an independent contractor.
10) Whether the Work is Partof the Regular Business of the
Hiring Party
Employees work in the course of an employer's trade or business. i i 6 They do not operate their own independent business, but
perform functions that are an essential part of the company's normal operations."17 An inference that a hired party is a servant may
arise when the occupation is one which ordinarily is considered incident to the employer's business establishment or to the function of
112. See generally United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 719 (1947) (where the
truckmen hire their own assistants, own their own trucks, pay their own expenses, with minor exceptions, and depend upon their own initiative, judgment

and energy for a large part of their success, they must be held to be independent
contractors); Short, 729 F.2d at 574 (finding the fact that both drivers were responsible for hiring and paying extra help when it was needed as a factor that
weighed against finding of employee status).
113. Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1986)
(finding that an insurance agent, who was able to hire and fire clerical employees without securing the insurance company's approval, though the agent could
not on his own hire additional insurance agents, would most probably not qual-

ify as an employee).
114.
115.
116.
117.

Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
La Noue, Tenure and Title VII, 1 J.C. & U.L. 206, 206 (Spring 1974).
Silk, 331 U.S. at 718.
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968).
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the household staff. 118 Thus, even highly skilled actors, such as
cooks and gardeners, who resent or even contract against interference, may be considered servants if they are regularly employed. 119
In Reid, "[c]reating sculptures was hardly 'regular business' for
CCNV.' 120 CCNV was a nonprofit unincorporated association dedi121
cated to eliminating homelessness in America.
Given that the university is also a nonprofit association, like
CCNV, this factor could weigh against the university, on the one
hand. On the other hand, it is part of the mission of the university
to aid in the understanding and development of knowledge. It does
this by requiring its faculty members to conduct research and publish the results of their analysis of their research. In this sense,
faculty publications could be considered to be part of the regular
business of the university.
11) Whether the Hiring Party is in Business
Whether the hiring party is in business is a factor in determining whether there exists an employment relationship between the
hiring and hired parties. 122 The implication is that if the hiring
party is in business, then the relationship between the two parties is
more likely to be one of employer and employee. In the Reid case,
CCNV was not in business at all, and that factor weighed against
12 3
finding that Reid was an employee of CCNV.
In the academic case, this factor is difficult to weigh because
while both public and private universities are nonprofit educational
institutions, they do provide a service for a fee to a client, i.e. students. An exchange of money does take place; students and their
parents are buying a service or group of services. 124 Indeed, universities have not hesitated to go into court to collect the money owed
to them by students and their parents. 125 Thus, a university could
be considered to be "in business," as distinguished from the finding
in Reid that CCNV was not in business because it was strictly a
nonprofit institution that raised money and spent it either directly
on the homeless or to draw attention to the plight of the homeless.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 comment i (1957).

119. Id.
120. Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2179.
121. Id.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(h) (1957).
123. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
124. Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of
the Student University Relationship, 8 J.C. & U.L. 141, 150 (1980-82).
125. Id. (citing Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Jacobsen, 53 N.J. Super. 539,
148 A.2d 63, appeal dismissed, 31 N.J. 221, 156 A.2d 251 (1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 808 (1960); Cornell Univ. v. Dickerson, 100 Misc. 2d 198, 418 N.Y.S.2d 977
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)).
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A finding that the university is in business would weigh in favor of
the university.
12) The Provision of Employee Benefits
When the hired party receives the benefits of the hiring party's
vacation plan and group insurance and pension fund, these facts
weigh in favor of finding that an employer/employee relationship
exists between the hired and hiring party. 126 In Reid, CCNV did
not provide any employment benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or worker's compensation funds for Reid, and this
fact weighed in favor of finding that Reid was an independent con127
tractor and not an employee of CCNV.
In the academic context, this factor weighs in favor of the university because it does provide its faculty members with benefits.
The university usually provides its faculty members with the "unfunded" benefits of vacations, holidays, leaves of absence and sick
leave; and the "funded" benefits of a retirement fund, disability insurance, life insurance, health insurance, dental insurance, and eye
insurance. 128 Some universities also provide additional fringe benefits such as travel accounts to attend professional meetings and
book accounts to purchase books. Universities have also been
known to waive fees for university courses for the faculty member
or his family and to pay professional dues, such as ABA membership fees for law professors.
13) The Tax Treatment of the Hired Party
The relationship of employer and employee determines the liability for employment taxes under the Social Security Act, with employers required to pay employment taxes for employees but not
for independent contractors. 129 Individuals performing services as
independent contractors are not employees. 130 Further, "physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors, subcontractors,
public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow an independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their
services to the public are independent contractors and not employees."'' 31 Where the hired party declares himself or herself to be an
independent contractor for tax purposes, this weighs against a find126. NLRB v. United Ins. Co.of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968).
127. Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2179.
128. Middleditch, College and University Fringe Benefits, 1 J.C. & U.L. 172,
172-73 (Winter 1973-1974).
129. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 718 (1947); Bartels v. Birmingham,
332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
130. Silk, 331 U.S. at 714 n.8 (quoting Treasury Regulation 90, promulgated
under Title IX of the Social Security Act Art. 205).
131. Id. at 715 n.8 (quoting 26 CFR § 400.205).
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ing that the hired party is an employee, particularly when the hiring party does not withhold state or federal taxes from the hired
party's salary. 132 In Reid, CCNV did not pay payroll or social security taxes for Reid, and this was one of the facts that led to the Court
finding that there was not an employment relationship between
133
Reid and CCNV.
In the academic context, the university pays unemployment,
worker's compensation, payroll, and social security taxes for its
faculty members. These facts would thus lead to a conclusion that
faculty members are employees for copyright purposes.
B. Assessment of Reid's Framework
The Supreme Court's determination that Reid was an independent contractor, which entitled him to claim copyright ownership in the sculpture, was easy because twelve of the thirteen
factors weighed in Reid's favor. When these factors are applied to
other facts, the conclusion of whether the hired party is an employee or an independent contractor may be more difficult to reach
because the Supreme Court did not provide any significant guidance
on how to assess the results. Even though the Restatement (Second) of Agency Law conditions the determination of whether the
hired party is a servant on whether the hired party is subject to the
hiring party's control or right to control, 134 the Supreme Court deliberately stated in Reid, as it has done on other occasions, 135 that
while the right to control was important, it is not dispositive. 136
The Court emphasized the totality of the circumstances as controlling. 137 Therefore, in some cases, the Court's opinion may allow
some factors to be accorded more weight than others.138 Whereas,
decisions in other cases may rest on a majority of the factors weighing in favor of one party or the other.
132. Short v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
729 F.2d 567, 574 (8th Cir. 1984).
133. Reid, 109 S.Ct at 2179.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957).
135. See Silk, 331 U.S. at 716; Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).

136. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2179.
137. Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130.
138. For example, Congress provided four factors to be used in determining
whether a particular use of a copyrighted work was fair: (1) the purpose and
character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. Courts have consistently stated that the fourth factor is to
be accorded the most weight. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) ("This last factor is undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use.") Thus, a defendant could have made an infringing use of a copyrighted work under factors one to three, but a non-infringing
use under factor four and the use would still be considered fair.
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If one applies a majority test to the academic context, the result
is difficult to determine. Scholarly works produced by academics
may or may not be considered works for hire because while four of
the thirteen factors weigh in favor of the faculty member and four
of the factors weigh in favor of the university, the remaining five
factors have equities for both sides. A determination that scholarly
works were not works for hire would not be contrary to previous
decisions that have specifically considered whether a particular
work prepared by an academic was a work for hire.
In Weinstein v. University of Rlinois,1 39 the Seventh Circuit
concluded that a work prepared by an assistant professor was not a
work for hire. The court stated that it has been a tradition since
copyright law began that if a professor of mathematics, for example,
proves a new theorem in the course of his employment, he will own
the copyright to his article containing that proof.140 In the context
of lectures by professors, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia held in Sherrill v. Loren C. Grieves141 that because a professor is not obliged to reduce his or her lectures to writing, if he or
she does so the lectures do not become the property of the employing institution. Thus, heretofore, the result of law and custom is
that faculty members and universities alike have assumed that the
142
faculty member owned the copyright to the scholarly work.
If the contrary result were reached that the university owned
the copyright to scholarly publications and academic lectures, a
threat to academic freedom and a conflict between book publishers
and universities could develop. Book publishers often obtain a written assignment of the copyright to academic texts under subsection
(2) of the work for hire definition because academic texts are one of
the nine enumerated categories. If the university claimed the copyright under subsection (1) as the employer of the academic, there
would be two competing claims to the copyright.
The determination of which claim was superior would come
from determining whether the work at issue was produced within
the scope of employment.

III. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
Since the Court decided that Reid was an independent contractor and not an employee, it did not reach the next issue of whether
the work was prepared within the scope of Reid's employment. For
an employer to claim authorship under section 201(b), the work
139. 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
140. Id. at 1094 (citing M. NIMMER & D.

NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 5.03[B][1][b](1978 ed.)).
141. 57 Wash. L.R. 286 ( Apr. 23, 1929), J. Copyright Decisions 675, 687.
142. Simon, supra note 13, at 486.

1990]

Reid's Impact on Scholarly Works

must have been produced within the scope of the employment. The
employer does not have automatic rights to everything the employee does. In a case considering whether speeches prepared by a
government employee, at home after normal working hours, or
while traveling, constituted government publications in which no
copyright could subsist, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
143
that none of the speeches were government publications.
Drawing the line between where specific duties begin and end
within the scope of employment has been difficult.'" One commentator 145 has deciphered three criteria that courts developed
construing the 1909 Act's "work made for hire" provision to determine if an employee work was produced within the scope of employment: (1) whether the work was produced at the employer's
place of business; (2) whether a work is completed within the normal business hours; and (3) whether the work is produced at the
instance and expense of the employer. 1' The commentator applied
these criteria to academics and concluded that copyrightable works
produced by a professor within his field of expertise probably fall
147
within the scope of the professor's employment.
There are two observations that need to be made. First, these
three criteria overlap with factors 4, 7, and 1 of the Reid framework,
which the Supreme Court developed to determine whether the individual is an employee or an independent contractor. Second,
these factors stem from cases construing the 1909 Act. When it
adopted the 1976 Act, Congress may have intended to dispense with
148
the reasoning developed by courts to interpret the 1909 Act.
Thus, these factors may no longer be relevant to the inquiry.
A more simple two-part test might suffice. The first part of the
inquiry would determine what is required for an employee to fulfill
satisfactorily the duties of his or her job. The second part of the
inquiry would determine whether the work created by the individual falls within the duties of the job. For the faculty member, application of this two part test would have varying results for different
works.
The faculty member is required to lecture, or in the law school
context to conduct socratic dialogue with students, but is not required to fix that lecture in a tangible form. Thus, once the faculty
member fixes that lecture in a tangible form-either written or on
143. Public Affairs Ass'n, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir 1960).
144. Duboff, supra note 14, at 31.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 31-2.
147. Id. at 34.
148. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1989); Easter
Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 1987).
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videotape-he or she would retain the copyright since fixation of
lectures was not required to fulfil the faculty member's teaching
duties. This result accords with the conclusion in Sherrill v.
149
Grieve.
As for scholarly works, those publications required as a condition of promotion and tenure and produced during the university
contract period may be considered within the scope of employment
because they are required to fulfil the professor's duties to the university. Similarly, when the university grants academic release
time during the semester, or a sabbatical leave, or a summer research grant to complete a specific work, the resulting work might
also be considered a work for hire because the work was prepared
to fulfil an official obligation to the university.
Nevertheless, there will also be scholarly works that fall
outside the academician's duties or works that are produced outside
of the contract period, and are, therefore, outside the scope of the
academician's employment. Some examples could be works produced by nontenured faculty members beyond the number needed
for promotion and tenure purposes as determined by the university's department, and perhaps all works produced by tenured
faculty members that are not a condition for merit raises. Other
examples could be works that are prepared during the one day a
week that universities usually allow for outside work, or works that
are prepared during a summer when the faculty member did not
receive a research grant.
CONCLUSION

The suggested test for determining the scope of employment,
along with refinement of the Reid test for determining whether an
employee relationship exists at the outset, would bring predictability to section 101 "work made for hire" (1) of the 1976 Act. Both
employers and employees could feel confident about which works
are within the scope of employment and which are not. Those
works that are within the scope of employment, but to which the
employee wishes to retain the copyright, can then become the sub150
ject of negotiation between the parties.
With this predictability, there should not be any adverse affects
on the incentive to create academic works. The incentive to create
in the early part of the academic's career would come from promo149. 57 Wash. L.R. 286. See supra text accompanying note 5 for the holding
in Sherrill.
150. See Simon, supra note 13, at 509. Most universities currently acknowledge in faculty handbooks that the faculty member shall retain the copyright in
his or her scholarly works. The handbooks also provide instances in which a
work prepared by a faculty member can be considered a work for hire.
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143

tion and tenure expectations, at a time when financial rewards are
likely to be limited. Later in the academic's career, the copyright
would remain the academic's and he or she would have an incentive
to exploit the copyright at a time when the financial rewards are
likely to be greater because of more opportunities to create works
that pay royalties.
In both instances, the university would benefit from the prestige that faculty writings bring, particularly in the later years when
an already established reputation has been enhanced by publication. Thus, both tests, in addition to being predictable, result in
comparable equities to both the faculty member and the university.

